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Warriors of Fortune: Presenting LURD-K & LURD-M in The Widening Rebel Ethnic Gap
By Tom Kamara 14 May 04 In the 1990s, the distinction was based on the personalities heading the various rebel ethnic factions. Alhaji Kromah was the effective leader of the Mandingo faction within the erstwhile rebel faction, United Liberation Movement fro Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). His faction was appropriately called ULIMO-K, not ULIMO-M, because he personified the rebel gang. Roosevelt Johnson headed the ethnic Krahn faction (in which George Dweh was an emerging star) for the same reason. Thus it became known as ULIMO-J, not ULIMO-K (Krahn). But the same dichotomy cannot be applied to the widening ethnic gap within ULIMO’s successor, another Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Although George Dweh seems to be the shinning knight around whom most of his ethnic kinsmen flock, he is not yet an effective leader of the faction in the mode of Roosevelt Johnson to deserve the distinction LURD-D (Dweh). Seku Damante Conneh and his estranged wife Aisha, are tussling over the leadership of the ethnic Mandingo faction, depriving his faction, if he has any left, the accolade LURD-C, nor his wife, LURD-A (Aisha). Moreover, there are other satellite, less influential tribes in the rebel conglomeration, such as Kissis, Lormas, Kpelles, Bassas, etc. As the record and events show, the Sappos, Krus, and other south-eastern tribes, because of common cultural attributes and affinity, are likely to align themselves with LURD-K, not LURD-M, also because of the common hatred against Mandingos as foreign intruders, however incorrect the perception. There is another factor making the distinction a little porous. Some members of these satellite and marginalised tribes may choose to line-up behind either LURD-K or LURD-M not on the basis of political ideology or programme, since there is none, but on the basis of job appointment or sharing the spoils of war. These bread and butter alliances may somehow disfigure the ethnic homogeneity of LURD-K and LURD-M, but not fundamentally. Key decisions (as we have seen in recent times, with the war on the position of the Governor of the National Bank as an example) are made in ethnic circles, since where common political beliefs are lacking, and the urge for war is money, the one rallying point is the tribe, in which some people feel more secure and comfortable. Thus the appropriate nomenclature is an outright ethnic one. So meet LURD-K (Lurd-Krahn) and LURD-M (LURD-Mandingo). Split within the rebel movement was present from the onset. In Conakry, Guinea, under harsh political and economic conditions, LURD-K members became the under dogs, since LURD-M members, at home amongst kinsmen, naturally had the ears of the authorities. When Charles Taylor attacked Cote d’Ívoire via his proxy armies (Movement for Greater West, amongst others), he in effect laid the basis for the emergence of LURD-K, now known as Movement for Democracy in Liberia in Liberia (MODEL). LURD officials, such as now the revenue collector Charles Bennie (ethnic Bassa or “Bassor”) then as spokesman based in Holland, denied MODEL existed. He insisted MODEL was LURD. But MODEL may have constituted some members of LURD. The fact is that it was independent, since it was receiving its weapons from another aggrieved benefactor—President Laurent Gbagbo. Once it could feed itself, it became openly independent and announced its birth in the contest for the spoils of war. Without this scenario, the rebels would have gone to the Accra peace talks under one umbrella, thereby minimising the number of jobs they would have been offered on the collective basis. The more rebel orbits the better, and it paid off handsomely on the table in Accra to share the loot. Author Dennis, an official of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) who later became an official serving Charles Taylor, put it splendidly after returning from one of the many peace talks in the 1990s. “We went for a racoon and brought an elephant”, he declared. He was talking about the alliance the AFL formed with Charles Taylor, in which Taylor promised the AFL head at the time, Gen. Hezekiah Bowen, to head the interim regime if Dr. Amos Sawyer would be dumped. “”What God got for me will see my face”, Gen. Bowen declared of the offer. Whether it ever saw his face is something else, but God has a wonderful way of solving problems. It is a similar scenario in the case of MODEL. As latecomers, and assisted by Ivorian fighters, they ended up carrying the elephant. The ethnic divide is an unfortunate development, but worst of all, is the idea that it should not be discussed openly, and that those who discuss this destructive mentality either hate or like this or that tribe. Closing ethnic ranks for political and hence economic rewards is a dangerous reality, and once it is discussed repeatedly, warnings signs could emerge against ethnic alliances in continuing wars of fortunes based on circulating lies about democracy and development when the real plans of the fortune warriors is precisely that—fortune hunting. Below is an excerpt of one of LURD’s (when it was under one umbrella with many holes promising it was different from Charles Taylor, a promise George Dweh now says is lie, since he says, Charles Taylor is not to blame: NATIONAL OBJECTIVESConsidering the state of affairs of our country Liberia, as described above, we in the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, LURD, being made up of all of the segments of the Liberian society irrespective of ethnic, political, religious or social backgrounds, hereby declare our national objectives as follows - To create the necessary conditions to enable Liberians to reconcile their differences, democratise their country, thereby restore peace and stability; - To promote and maintain regional and international peace and security; - To uphold respect international and constitutional laws Realising these objectives, we believe will enhance the reconstruction and development of our country; realising these objectives, we firmly believe, considering the role of Mr. Charles Taylor in the Mano River Basin in particular and West Africa in general, will restore lasting peace and stability in the entire region. PRAGMATIC PLAN OF ACTION The following, therefore, is a descriptive outline of our plan of action for Liberia: Cessation of Hostilities and Convening Of National Conference For Formation Of Interim Government Upon Mr. Taylor's removal from power, LURD will immediately call upon Liberians, including all segments of the Liberian society, to convene a National Conference at which a caretaker government that will present all Liberians will be formed. All civic organizations including the Inter-Religious Council, political parties, the masses of the Liberian people -- the ordinary citizens who are the most affected of the war will surely be represented and have a voice in the decision making process at this conference. International supervision or involvement - the UN, the AU, ECOWAS - in such a National Conference to ensure compliance to standards of democracy, will be necessary. LURD will appeal to the US and EU specifically to play major roles in this process. This government will be called: INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION The government will have a life span of two years for certain. Duties Of The Interim Government The primary responsibility of the interim government is specifically geared towards, but not limited to, achieving the following administrative goals: a. Establishing good relations with Liberia's neighbours and the international community. b. Repatriation and Resettlement of Liberian Refugees. c. Resettlement and aiding of all internally displaced Liberians. d. Restoration of electricity in the nation's capital and the laying of aground work for nationwide electrification after election. e. Restoration of telecommunications in the nation's capital and the design of a plan for a nationwide telecommunications network for next regime. f. Restoration of water, and sewage management in the nation's capital and laying plan for a nationwide clean water supply system after election. g. Improvement of streets in the nation's capital and laying plan for a nationwide highway system for the next government. h. Convening a national constitutional conference, eight months upon the assumption of office by the Interim Government, to review and deliberate upon the Constitution of Liberia, and other national policies issues such as: - Whether we should maintain or minimise the current powers of the Liberian President as a guard against usurpation. - Whether we should maintain the centralized form of government or create decentralized government to put in place more checks and balances against dictatorship. - Whether we should elect superintendents once known as governors or still have them appointed by the president. - Whether revenue should be shared between the political sub-divisions and the central government and if so, at what percentage and how should the collection be done? - Whether each political sub-division should control its own police force or should we maintain the National Police Force. - Whether Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and magistrates should be elected by the people to give the Judicial Branch of Government the independence it needs to administer transparent justice or should the president continue to appoint judicial officials. i. Re-establishing public education and public health systems in the Nation's Capital and developing a plan for public education and public health care systems nationwide for implementation after election. j. Establishing a Public Commission of experts, opinion leaders and businessmen from all sectors of the country with the authority to set up a performance timetable and to review the performance of the Interim Government on a quarterly basis. The Interim Head of State should appoint such Commission. Six months into the interim period, the United Nations shall be requested to conduct national elections at the end of the two-year period. The Head of State and Vice Head of State of the Interim Government shall not be eligible to run for public office. Other high officials of the Interim Government shall resign six months prior to national elections if they wish to canvass for public office… Any more doubts about warriors of fortune?
--Tom Kamara |
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